I. INTRODUCTION
Within the overlapping fields of neurolaw and neuroethics, scholars have given significant attention to the implications of advances in neuroscience for issues in criminal law, 1 criminal procedure, 2 constitutional law, 3 law and religion, 4 tort law, 5 evidence law, 6 confidentiality and organizers asked the speakers to think about how advances in neuroscience provide insights that might challenge the physical-mental dichotomy, 12 I particularly wanted to focus on: (1) whether the laws in these three areas provide fewer or otherwise different benefits for individuals with mental versus physical injuries, diseases, and disorders; and, if so (2) whether neuroscience is being used to confront these different benefit sets.
II. DISABILITY BENEFIT LAW
The first area on which I wanted to focus is disability benefit law. Disability benefits can be public, such as the cash disability benefits provided by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to individuals who meet the SSA's definition of disability. 13 Disability benefits can also be private, such as the cash disability benefits provided by NEUROETHICS 101 (2008) . As such, the discussions of disability benefit law, mental health parity law, and disability discrimination law found in this Article are also available in whole or in part in the publications listed above and are taken with permission by the Author. (Oct. 4, 2013) available at http://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/events/current.cfm?eid=162 (stating, "Legal systems have traditionally treated physical and mental injuries differently. Advances in neuroscience provide insights that challenge this dichotomy. This multidisciplinary half-day conference will examine some of the evolving technologies used to demonstrate mental injury and explore the potential impact of this neuroscientific data in legal decision making.").
698
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:2 administrators of short-and long-term disability insurance plans to individuals who participate in such plans as a benefit of employment or who purchase such plans on the open insurance market. 14 With respect to public disability benefits, Title II of the SSA provides for the payment of federal Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits to individuals with both physical and mental disabilities. 15 Indeed, the SSA defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment." 16 An applicant's impairment or impairments must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 17 The applicant's impairment must last or be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, or be expected to result in death. 18 The Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) has established a five-step sequential evaluation for determining whether an individual has a disability that qualifies for the receipt of SSDI benefits. 19 First, a 14 Disability income insurance protects an individual's income. If an individual becomes unable to work due to a sickness or injury, disability income insurance provides cash benefits that the individual may use to pay for housing, food, clothing, and utilities, among other living expenses. Designed to provide financial security until the individual returns to work, disability income insurance typically pays a monthly cash benefit after an initial waiting period that is equivalent to a percentage of the individual's salary. See, e.g., Mass Mutual Financial Group, Disability Income Insurance, https://www.massmutual.com/sem/disabilityinsurance?cm_mmc=google-_-disability_nb-_-ppc-_-60777225-VQ16-c (last visited August 11, 2015) .
15 See, e.g., Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992 23 Third, if the individual has a severe impairment, a determination is made regarding whether the impairment meets or equals one of a number of "listed impairments" in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. If the impairment meets or equals a "listed impairment," the individual is conclusively presumed to have a disability. 24 Fourth, if the impairment does not meet or equal a "listed impairment," a determination is made regarding whether the impairment prevents the individual from performing past relevant work. If the individual can perform past relevant work, benefits are denied. 25 Fifth, if the individual cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the individual is able to perform other kinds of work. The individual is entitled to SSDI benefits only if the person is unable to perform other work. 26 In addition to public SSDI benefits, private disability income insurers also offer private disability income insurance plans. These plans provide short-and long-term cash benefits to individuals who become disabled. Private disability benefits are governed not by the five-step sequential analysis set forth in federal law, above, but by the terms of the plan itself. 27 As discussed in more detail (1987) 35 In the lawsuit, Ms. Reid sought to recover longterm disability benefits. 36 The legal issue before the court was whether Ms. Reid had a mental diagnosis of bipolar disorder, depression, and/or attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which would limit her to just twenty-four months of disability benefits, or whether her primary diagnosis was dementia, which would make her eligible for long-term disability benefits. 37 Of course, Ms. Reid argued that she had dementia, a physical disability. 38 MetLife took the position that Ms. Reid had bipolar disorder, a mental disability. 39 In a wonderfully detailed, forty-nine page judicial opinion, District Judge Amy Totenberg thoroughly analyzed a number of medical opinions regarding the proper classification of Ms. Reid's disability. 40 In Ms. Reid's earlier medical records, her treating physicians had diagnosed her with bipolar disorder, depression, and/or ADHD in light of behaviors such as spending too much money on jewelry. 41 In Ms. Reid's later medical records, her treating physicians diagnosed her with dementia in light of her significant memory problems, difficulty formulating words and thoughts, and difficulty processing information and making decisions. 42 MetLife's three independent physician consultants, each of whom completed a single review of Ms. The Reid case is an excellent illustrator of how private disability benefit plans distinguish between physical and mental disabilities and provide fewer benefits for individuals with mental disabilities.
The case also illustrates how litigants and judges are using neuroimaging to confront the somewhat artificial distinctions between physical and mental disabilities. I chose the Reid case for discussion not only for these reasons, but also because Judge Totenberg actually addressed the legal distinctions between physical and mental disabilities. Indeed, Judge Totenberg quoted the preface to the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) then-current edition of the Diagnostic 44 Id. at 1315-16. 45 Id. at 1285. 46 Id. at 1286-87. 47 Id. at 1323. 48 Id. at 1280, 1315-16 (stating, "The court finds Dr. Stallings' opinions, based on an eight-year treating relationship with Plaintiff and Dr. Carstens's reports, the MRI results, and repeated neurological testing results to be far more reliable than the opinions of Met-Life's three IPC's whose opinions were each based on a single file review.").
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and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) to explain that:
[T]he term mental disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between "mental" disorders and "physical" disorders that is a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism. A compelling literature documents that there is much "physical" in "mental" disorders and much "mental" in "physical" disorders. The problem raised by the term "mental" disorders has been much clearer than its solution, and, unfortunately, the term persists in the title of DSM-IV because we have not found an appropriate substitute. 49 That is, Judge Totenberg correctly recognized that the Plan was forcing her to make a decision regarding whether Ms. Reid had a physical or mental disability even though the APA itself believes that there is much physical in mental and much mental in physical and that no definition of "mental disorder" could adequately specify precise boundaries between the physical and mental. I also liked how Judge Totenberg recognized that a clinical diagnosis of a mental disorder under the DSM-IV generally is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a mental disability:
When the DSM-IV categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for forensic purposes, there are significant risks that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood. These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis. In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a 49 Id. at 1305-06. The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ("DSM-5") is the current edition but the DSM-IV was current at the time of the facts giving rise to the Reid case.
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INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:2 DSM-IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a "mental disorder," "mental disability," "mental disease," or "mental defect." In determining whether an individual meets a specified legal standard (e.g., for competence, criminal responsibility, or disability), additional information is usually required beyond that contained in the DSM-IV diagnosis. This might include information about the individual's functional impairments and how these impairments affect the particular abilities in questions. 50 Because the MetLife Plan at issue defined mental disability entirely in terms of the DSM-IV, 51 Judge Totenberg based her legal decision on whether Ms. Reid met the manual's diagnostic criteria for dementia. 52 Judge Totenberg correctly recognized, however, that the APA designed the manual for use by clinicians in the clinic, not for judges and lawyers in the courtroom. 53 Stated another way, Judge Totenberg seemed to be suggesting that private disability plans' heavy reliance on the DSM-IV might be displaced given the different objectives of law and medicine.
The Reid case involved a claim for private disability benefits. Claims for public disability benefits are somewhat different. As discussed above, federal law does not on its face discriminate against claimants with mental disabilities by providing less comprehensive disability income insurance benefits for individuals with mental disabilities compared to 50 Id. at 1307. 51 See id. at 1282 (referencing the Plan provision stating that "Mental or Nervous Disorder or Disease means a medical condition which meets the diagnostic criteria set forth in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic And Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as of the date of Your Disability."). 52 Id. at 1308-11. 53 Id. at 1306 ("The diagnostic categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are meant to be employed by individuals with appropriate clinical training and experience in diagnosis. It is important that DSM-IV not be applied mechanically by untrained individuals.").
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individuals with physical disabilities. 54 As applied, however, federal law can make it more difficult for individuals who claim that they have a mental disability to prove that disability because federal law requires the impairment to be "medically determinable." As one might imagine, historically it has been easier for claimants to use radiologic, laboratory, and other diagnostic tests to prove a physical disability compared to a mental disability. 55 For example, a computed tomography (CT) and other brain scans can be used to diagnose certain types of physical (traumatic) brain injuries. On the other hand, individuals with major depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia historically have not had access to a similar radiologic diagnostic tool.
However, advances in neuroimaging may be making it slightly easier for individuals to prove their mental disabilities. For example, SSDI claimants are now offering neuroimaging evidence as confirmatory evidence of their mental disabilities and some courts are accepting the confirmation provided by such evidence. For example, one SSDI claimant with alcohol dependence submitted to the SSA a neuroimage that was interpreted to reveal alcoholic cortical atrophy, which correlated with dementia and impaired capacity to work. 56 The reviewing court agreed that the neuroimage was confirmatory of the claimant's mental disability claim and clinically correlated with his abnormal mental status examination, functional incapacity, and neuropsychological testing. 57 54 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2015) (defining "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment") (emphasis added 
III. MENTAL HEALTH PARITY LAW
Like the private disability plans discussed in Part II, private health insurance policies and plans also (at least historically) have distinguished between physical and mental illnesses and have provided inferior insurance benefits for mental illnesses. That is, private health insurance policies and plans have either completely excluded treatments and services for mental disorders from insurance coverage or have provided less comprehensive health insurance coverage for mental disorders. 58 I teach at the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (Boyd), located a few blocks from the famous Las Vegas Strip, and at Boyd we think a lot about the legal rights of individuals with gambling disorders as well as the legal responsibilities of casinos vis-à-vis such individuals. Historically, many private health plans have provided no insurance coverage of treatments and services for gambling disorder 59 as well as many similar mental disorders. 60 In the past two decades, health insurance law has eliminated most, but still not all, of these mental health benefit disparities. After reviewing recent improvements in mental health parity law, I will use the case of gambling disorder to illustrate how advances in neuroscience are being used to confront remaining mental health benefit disparities. The federal government took its first step towards establishing mental health parity on September 26, 1996, when President Bill Clinton signed the federal Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) into law. 61 As originally enacted, MHPA prohibited large group health plans that offered medical and surgical benefits as well as mental health benefits from imposing more stringent lifetime and annual spending limits on their offered mental health benefits. 62 For example, MHPA would have prohibited a large group health plan from imposing a $20,000 annual cap or a $100,000 lifetime cap on mental health care if the plan had no annual or lifetime caps for medical and surgical care or if the plan had higher caps, such as a $50,000 annual cap or a $500,000 lifetime cap, for medical and surgical care. 63 The problem with MHPA was that its application and scope were very limited. As originally enacted, MHPA only regulated insured and self-insured group health plans of large employers, then defined as those employers that employed an average of fifty-one or more employees. 64 MHPA thus did not apply to the group health plans of small employers. 65 MHPA also did not apply to individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed care plans, or any self-funded, non-federal governmental plan whose sponsor opted out of MHPA. 66 
65
See id. § 712(c)(1)(A), (B) (exempting from MHPA application group health plans of small employers; defining small employers as those who employed an average of at least 2 but not more than fifty employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least two employees on the first day of the plan year).
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Vol. 12:2 contained an "increased cost" exemption for covered group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such plans if the application of MHPA resulted in an increase in the cost under the plan of at least one percent. 67 By November 1998, over two years following MHPA's enactment, only four plans across the United States had obtained exemptions due to cost increases of one percent or more. 68 In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPA was neither a mandated offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in MHPA required a large group health plan to actually offer or provide any mental health benefits. 69 Thus, health plans were free after the enactment of MHPA to simply not provide any benefits for gambling disorder or any other mental health condition. 70 As originally enacted, MHPA also was not a comprehensive parity law because it expressly excluded from protection individuals with substance use and addictive disorders, such as alcohol use disorder and other drug use disorders. 71 74 In particular, MHPAEA provided that any financial requirements (including deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and other out-of-pocket expenses) 75 and treatment limitations (including inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations) 76 that large group health plans imposed on mental health and substance use disorder benefits must not be any more restrictive than the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations imposed by the plan on substantially all medical and surgical benefits. 77 MHPAEA thus would have prohibited large group health plans from imposing higher deductibles, copayments, or coinsurances, or lower inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, on individuals seeking care for gambling disorder or any other mental health or duration, or scope of mental health benefits under the plan or coverage . . . "). See id. (requiring both financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to mental health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more restrictive than the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations applied to substantially all physical health benefits covered by the plan).
Vol. 12:2 substance use disorder listed in the current edition of the DSM or the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). 78 Like MHPA, MHPAEA's application and scope were very limited. As originally enacted, MHPAEA only regulated insured and self-insured group health plans of large employers, defined as those employers that employ an average of fifty-one or more employees. 79 MHPAEA, like MHPA, did not apply to small group health plans, individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed care plans, or any self-funded, non-federal governmental plans whose sponsors had opted out of MHPAEA. 80 In terms of its substantive provisions, 78 See, e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68286 (Nov. 13, 2013) (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 146.136, a federal regulation implementing MHPAEA that requires a plan's definition of "mental health benefits" and "substance use disorder benefits" to be "consistent with generally recognized independent standards of current medical practice (for example, the most current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the most current version of the ICD, or State guidelines"). (2010) Before President Obama signed the health care reform bill into law, then, mental health insurance benefits were regulated by MHPA as expanded by MHPAEA as well as by more stringent state law. 85 That is, unless a more stringent state law required a health plan to provide gambling disorder benefits or other mental health benefits (which state law usually did not), a health plan was not required to provide such benefits.
In late March 2010, President Obama responded to this limitation by signing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) into law (as consolidated, the Affordable Care Act (ACA)). 86 Best known for its controversial individual health insurance mandate, 87 ACA has two sets of provisions that relate to mental health parity and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits. Upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 28, 2012, 88 these two sets of provisions eliminate some of the limitations of MHPA and MHPAEA.
The first set of ACA provisions extends MHPA's and MHPAEA's mental health parity provisions to the individual and small group health plans offered on and off 84 Id. 87 ACA § 1501(a) (adding to the Internal Revenue Code: ''An applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.").
88 Nat'l. Fed'n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012 .
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the health insurance exchanges. 89 Now, many individual and small group health plans that previously discriminated against individuals with gambling disorder and other mental health conditions through higher deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance rates, as well as lower inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations, must comply with MHPA and MHPAEA. 90 The second set of relevant ACA provisions requires certain health plans to actually provide mental health and substance use disorder benefits. That is, ACA now requires individual and small group health plans, 91 exchange-offered qualified health plans, 92 State basic health plans, 93 and Medicaid benchmark and Medicaid benchmark plans 94 to offer "mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatments" in addition to nine other categories of essential health benefits (EHBs). 95 Unfortunately, not every individual with health insurance will benefit from these ten required EHB categories because 89 ACA, supra note 86, § 1311(j) (entitled, "Applicability of Mental Health Parity") (stating, " [MHPAEA] shall apply to qualified health plans in the same manner and to the same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers and group health plans."); 42 U.S.C. 
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INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:2 grandfathered health plans, large group health plans, and self-insured health plans are exempt from the requirement to provide the ten EHB categories. 96 For those health plans that must provide benefits within the ten EHB categories, the statutory EHB requirements are unclear as to whether particular benefits, such as gambling disorder benefits, are required. As a result, the COST (2011) , at 1-8, 1-9, 1-10 and Box 1-2 (listing the health plan settings to which ACA's EHB requirement do not apply); Sara Rosenbaum et al., The Essential Health Benefits Provisions of the Affordable Care Act: Implications for People with Disabilities, 3 COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 3 (Mar. 24, 2011 ) ("The act exempts large-group health plans, as well as self-insured ERISA plans and ERISA-governed multiemployer welfare arrangements not subject to state insurance law, from the essential benefit requirements.").
97 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 12834 (Feb. 25, 2013) 106 On March 31, 2012, however, the Nevada Benchmark Plan excluded coverage for a class of mental health conditions known as the "impulse control disorders." 107 Because the then-current (2012) edition of the DSM-the DSM-IV-TR-classified "pathological gambling" as an impulse control disorder, the result was that the Nevada Benchmark Plan excluded coverage for treatments for gambling disorders for years 2014 through 2016. That is, through the end of 2016, Nevada residents will not benefit from any mandatory gambling disorder benefits and will only have benefits to the extent their health plans voluntarily provide gambling disorder benefits or their states independently fund gambling disorder treatments. However, due to neuroimaging, the story may be very different for years 2017 and beyond. That is, advances in the neuroscientific understanding of certain mental disorders have resulted in their reclassification in the DSM. Let us use gambling disorder as an example. First recognized by the APA in the DSM-III in 1980, 108 a condition then-named "pathological gambling" was classified within the "Disorders of Impulse Control Not Elsewhere Classified." 109 Characterized with reference to an individual's "chronic and progressive failure to resist impulses to gamble and gambling behavior that compromises, disrupts, or damages personal, family, or vocational pursuits," pathological gambling was believed by the APA to have an adolescent age of onset and to be more common among males than females and more common in the fathers of males and in the mothers of females. 110 Predisposing factors were thought to include loss of parent by death, separation, divorce, or desertion before the individual turned fifteen years of age; inappropriate parental discipline; exposure to gambling activities as an adolescent; a high family value on material and financial symbols; and lack of family emphasis on saving, planning, and budgeting. 111 . 112 The DSM-5, published in May 2013, 113 took pathological gambling in a new direction. First, the DSM-5 re-named the condition "gambling disorder," 114 reflecting concerns that the adjective "pathological" is pejorative and reinforces the social stigma associated with problem gambling. 115 Second, the DSM-5 re-classified gambling disorder and placed it as the sole disorder within the "Non-SubstanceRelated Disorders" section within the larger "SubstanceRelated and Addictive Disorders" chapter. 116 Now, gambling disorder follows alcohol use disorder, cannabis use disorder, opioid use disorder, stimulant use disorder, and tobacco use disorder, among other substance-related and addictive disorders. 117 The change in gambling disorder's classification reflected neuroimaging evidence that "gambling behaviors activate [neural] reward systems similar to those activated by drugs of abuse and produce [s] behavioral symptoms that appear comparable to those produced by the substance use disorders." 118 Charles O'Brien, M.D., who chaired the gambling disorder would be the only disorder in the behavioral, or nonsubstance, portion of the substance-related and addictive disorders category).
Substance-Related Disorders Work Group for the DSM-5, explained:
The idea of a non-substance-related addiction may be new to some people, but those of us who are studying the mechanisms of addiction find strong evidence from animal and human research that addiction is a disorder of the brain reward system, and it doesn't matter whether the system is repeatedly activated by gambling or alcohol or another substance. . . . In functional brain imaging-whether with gamblers or drug addicts-when they are showed video or photograph cues associated with their addiction, the same brain areas are activated. 119 In summary, the current Nevada Benchmark Plan includes coverage for outpatient and inpatient treatment of substance-related and addictive conditions.
If this benchmark plan is selected again for years 2017 and beyond, 120 the result would be that insurance coverage of substance-related and addictive conditions, now including gambling disorder, would be required by federal law. Stated slightly differently, advances in the neuroscientific understanding of gambling disorder will have positively impacted the disorder's insurance coverage.
Disorders-Including Alcoholism, Attention-Deficit Disorder, Drug Abuse and Food Bingeing-May Have a Common Genetic Basis, 84 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 132, 140 (1996) (noting the affinities between pathological gambling and alcohol and drug abuse). 120 See 80 Fed. Reg. 10750, 10812-13 (Feb. 27, 2015) (requiring each state to select a new base-benchmark plan for the 2017 plan year based on a 2014 plan meeting the requirements of 45 C.F.R. § 156.110; explaining, " [W] e are finalizing the re-codification of part of § 156.120 as proposed, as well as our proposal to allow issuers to design a plan that is substantially equal to the newly selected 2014 benchmark plan for the 2017 plan year.").
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IV. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW
The final area of the law on which I wanted to focus is disability discrimination law. Like public disability benefit law, disability discrimination law does not generally discriminate against individuals with mental disabilities. However, disability discrimination law does except certain conditions, including a handful of mental health conditions, from the definition of disability. Although litigants have not yet used advances in neuroscience to confront these exceptions, I predict that they will shortly.
As background, a range of anti-discrimination protections and accommodations are available to qualified individuals who have physical and mental disabilities under a variety of federal and state laws. Signed into law by President Richard Nixon on September 26, 1973, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits employers and organizations that receive federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of disability against qualified individuals with disabilities. 121 The original Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), signed into law by President George H.W. Bush on July 26, 1990, prohibits certain employers, state and local government agencies, and places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of disability against qualified individuals with disabilities. 122 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 25, 2008, clarifies that the ADA's definition of disability should be broadly construed in favor of individuals with physical and mental impairments who seek protection and generally
